The Battle for the Wrong Mistake: Risk Salience in Canadian Refugee Status Decision-making by Cameron, Hilary Evans
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 42 
Issue 1 Immigration Issue Article 2 
4-1-2019 
The Battle for the Wrong Mistake: Risk Salience in Canadian 
Refugee Status Decision-making 
Hilary Evans Cameron 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hilary Evans Cameron, “The Battle for the Wrong Mistake: Risk Salience in Canadian Refugee Status 
Decision-making” (2019) 42:1 DLJ 1. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
D
A
L
H
O
U
S
IE
 L
A
W
 J
O
U
R
N
A
L
93
DALHOUSIE 
LAW 
JOURNAL
Volume 42 Number 1 Spring 2019
Immigration
The Battle for the Wrong Mistake:  Risk Salience in
Canadian Refugee Status Decision-making
 Hilary Evans Cameron
Immigration, Xenophobia and Equality Rights
 Donald Galloway
Once More unto the Breach:  Confronting the Standard of
Review (Again) and the Imperative of Correctness Review
when Interpreting the Scope of Refugee Protection
 Gerald Heckman and Amar Khoday
Do the Means Change the Ends?  Express Entry and
Economic Immigration in Canada
 Asha Kaushal
Medical Inadmissibility, and Physically and 
Mentally Disabled Would-be Immigrants:  
Canada’s Story Continues
 Constance MacIntosh
Migrant Workers, Rights, and the Rule of Law:
Responding to the Justice Gap
 Sarah Marsden
Quand voyager mène au renvoi:  analyse critique de la
législation canadienne sur la perte du statut de résident
permanent liée à la perte de l’asile
 Hélène Mayrand
The MV Sun Sea:  A Case Study on the Need for
Greater Accountability Mechanisms at Canada 
Border Services Agency
 Lobat Sadrehashemi
Hilary Evans Cameron* ? The Battle for the Wrong Mistake:
 Risk Salience in Canadian Refugee
 Status Decision-making
Canadian refugee status adjudicators must choose between two opposing bodies 
of law, one of which resolves doubt in the claimant’s favour and the other at the 
claimant’s expense. How do they decide which to prefer? How do they decide 
whether it would be better to risk accepting an unfounded claim or to risk rejecting 
a well-founded one? This paper explores one potentially relevant factor: the salience 
of the harms that decision-makers associate with potential risk outcomes. A brief 
account of recent events in Canadian refugee law history, beginning with the refugee 
law reforms of former Conservative Immigration Minister Jason Kenney, shows how 
risk salience can be manipulated. For each refugee claim to be heard on its own 
merits, the law cannot leave adjudicators to decide for themselves which kind of 
error to prefer. It must recognize that sending a refugee home to persecution is the 
wrong mistake.
Les arbitres canadiens du statut de réfugié doivent choisir entre deux arsenaux 
juridiques opposés, dont l’un tranche en faveur du demandeur d’asile et l’autre aux 
frais de ce dernier. Comment décident-ils lequel préférer? Comment décident-ils s’il 
vaut mieux prendre le risque d’accepter une demande non fondée ou de rejeter une 
demande fondée? Le présent article explore un facteur potentiellement pertinent : 
l’importance des préjudices que les décideurs associent aux résultats des risques 
potentiels. Un bref compte rendu des événements récents dans l’histoire du droit 
canadien des réfugiés, à commencer par les réformes du droit des réfugiés de 
l’ancien ministre conservateur de l’Immigration Jason Kenney, montre comment on 
peut manipuler l’importance du risque. Pour que chaque revendication du statut de 
réfugié soit entendue sur le fond, la loi ne peut laisser les arbitres décider eux-mêmes 
du type d’erreur qu’ils préfèrent. Il doit reconnaître que le renvoi d’un réfugié chez lui 
pour être persécuté est la mauvaise décision et une erreur.
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To make ? ndings of fact in any legal domain, decision-makers must turn 
their doubts into certainty. They must decide by the end of the fact-? nding 
process which of the relevant allegations to accept and which to reject. To 
do this, they must resolve all relevant doubts, either in favour of accepting 
a given allegation or in favour of rejecting it. But which way should they 
err? Should they more readily run the risk of accepting a false allegation 
or of rejecting a true one? Which of these two potential mistakes would 
be worse?
Burdens of proof, standards of proof and presumptions are the law’s 
tools for managing this process, for controlling whether and to what extent 
an allegation should “pay the price” for the decision-maker’s doubts.1 If 
every decision-maker could decide for herself how she would prefer to 
resolve her uncertainty—and could change her preference in any case, 
for any reason—decisions would be arbitrary and unjust. 2 The law’s fact-
? nding structures therefore have one job: they work together to try to 
constrain decision-makers to follow the law’s error preference rather than 
their own.
Blackstone’s Maxim is one of the common law’s most famous notions: 
“It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 3 
The criminal law’s strong theoretical preference for erring in favour of the 
accused is why its fact-? nding structures work as they do. The prosecution 
bears the burden of proof; the standard of proof is very high, proof of guilt 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”; and many presumptions favour the accused 
1. Richard H Gaskins, ???????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ????????? (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992) 3. See discussion in Hilary Evans Cameron, ??????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), Chapter 1. See also 
Dayna Nadine Scott, “Shifting the Burden of Proof: The Precautionary Principle and Its Potential for 
the ‘Democratization’ of Risk” in Law Commission of Canada, ed, ???????????(Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2005) 50 (“[w]ho should be burdened by—and who should bene? t from—the limits of our 
understanding?” at 51). Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, “A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-
of-the-Evidence Standard” (1983) 131:5 U Pa L Rev 1159 at 1173; Michael L DeKay, “The Difference 
between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof” (1996) 21:1 Law & Soc 
Inquiry 95 at 131; John Kaplan, “Decision Theory and the Fact? nding Process” (1968) 20:6 Stan L 
Rev 1065.
2. As Kaplan explains, while the law’s preference for erring on the side of the accused is a 
“fundamental tenet” of the criminal law, the accused’s reputation and the nature of the crime (in 
particular, whether it is one with a high likelihood of recidivism) are factors that might reasonably 
in? ate the jury’s perception of the harm of a false acquittal. Since these are eminently rational 
considerations, the problem that the law faces in trying to ensure that all cases are decided according 
to the same set of decision-making principles—“one of the basic dilemmas of our criminal system”—
is in essence how to stop jurors from reasoning rationally. Kaplan, ???? at 1074-1077.
3. William Blackstone, ????????????????????????????????????352 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
1769) cited in DeKay, ????? note 1 at 96. See also Alexander Volokh, “??Guilty Men” (1997) 146 U 
Pa L Rev?173. 
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??????????????????????????????????????????
and few favour the prosecution.4 While the criminal justice system may 
in fact treat any number of accused very badly, and while the law’s fact-
? nding structures may not constrain its judges and juries in practice , at the 
level of its legal theory, the criminal law resolves doubt ? rmly in favour 
of the accused.5
As I have argued elsewhere, Canadian refugee law, in sharp contrast, 
leaves its decision-makers—the members of the Refugee Protection 
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board—entirely free to resolve 
their doubts in accordance with their own preferences.6 This is because 
our Federal Court, which develops Canadian refugee law in its judgments 
on review of the Board’s decisions, is itself profoundly split about which 
kind of mistake Board members ought to prefer: should they more readily 
risk granting a refugee claim that should have been denied or denying 
a claim that should have been granted? As a result, the Court interprets 
refugee law’s fact-? nding structures differently in two opposing bodies 
of law, one of which resolves doubt in the claimant’s favour and the other 
at the claimant’s expense. A Board member can choose which of these 
bodies of law she prefers to apply—and can change her preference in 
any case, for any reason. In a refugee hearing, a context characterized by 
“radical uncertainty”7 where doubt lurks around every corner, the ability 
to tip the balance in either direction will often allow members to reach 
either conclusion on the same evidence. I have argued that this may help 
to explain the “vast disparities”8 in the Board members’ acceptance rates.
How, then, do Board members decide which kind of mistake to prefer? 
This paper looks at one potentially relevant factor. As discussed below, 
4. See Evans Cameron, ????? note 1.
5. See Kaplan, ????? note 1 at 1075. Several studies of jury decision-making have also noted that 
jurors may apply their own interpretations of both the civil and criminal standards of proof that differ 
from the law’s interpretations. See, e.g., Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, “Quantifying Burdens 
of Proof” (1971) 5:3 Law & Soc’y Rev 319; Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, “Loss Aversion, Omission 
Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation” (2012) 41:1 J Leg Stud 165; James Andreoni, 
“Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?” (1991) 
22:3 Rand J Economics 385.
6. Evans Cameron, ????? note 1.
7. Audrey Macklin, “Coming Between Law and the State: Church Sanctuary for Non-citizens,” 
Nexus, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law (Fall/Winter 2005) 49, 51, cited in Trish Luker, 
“Decision Making Conditioned by Radical Uncertainty: Credibility Assessment at the Australian 
Refugee Review Tribunal” (2013) 25 Intl J Refugee L 502 at 515.
8. Sean Rehaag, “2017 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates” ?????????
???????? ???????????? (26 March 2018), online: <http://ccrweb.ca/en/2017-refugee-claim-data>. As 
Rehaag notes, while grant rates can of course be expected to vary as a function of the claimant’s 
country of origin, “substantial differences” persist when this factor is taken into account. This level of 
disparity observed in 2017 “is consistent with similar ? ndings from prior years for Canada’s previous 
and new refugee determination systems.” See also Sean Rehaag, “Troubling Patterns in Canadian 
Refugee Adjudication” (2008) 39:2 Ottawa L Rev 335.
?? ?????????????????????????
error preference judgments are affected by the salience of the harms that 
decision-makers associate with potential outcomes. ‘Salience’ captures the 
idea that for any decision-maker some types of harm will resonate more 
strongly than others: some kinds of harms will capture their imagination, 
will “strike them more forcefully,” will “stand out.” 9 To illustrate this idea, 
and its relevance to what I have called “refugee law’s fact-? nding crisis,”10
this paper will give a brief account of some recent events in Canadian 
refugee law history, beginning with the refugee law reforms of former 
Conservative Immigration Minister Jason Kenney.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
As Minister Jason Kenney went about overhauling the country’s refugee 
determination system in the early 2010s, he claimed time and again that 
change was needed because Board members were too often making one 
kind of mistake: giving refugee protection to those who did not need 
it. Although Kenney proudly maintained that the Canadian system was 
head and shoulders above the rest—“the model system in the world 
for refugee protection”11—when our Board recognized more refugees 
than decision-makers in other countries, this did not suggest to Kenney 
that this ‘model’ system was working, catching those who elsewhere 
were slipping through the cracks. It rather implied, on its face, “a fairly 
signi? cant degree of abuse.”12 The Board’s surplus positive decisions were 
not merely exceptional, in other words, they were ????????. And Kenney 
had complained for years that these mistakes were coming at too high a 
price. Among other things, the Board’s “incredibly high acceptance rate 
for refugee claimants” was making Canada “the laughingstock of the 
world.”13
Yet two potential mistakes hang in the balance in a refugee hearing. 
The Board might mistakenly grant refugee protection, or it might 
9. Seumas Miller, “Co-ordination, Salience and Rationality” (1991) 29 Southern J Philosophy?359 
at 362. See also Els CM van Schie & Joop van der Pligt, “In? uencing Risk Preference in Decision 
Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience” (1995) 63:3 Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes?264.
10. Evans Cameron, ????? note 1.
11. Canada, Parliament, ????????????????????????, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 146, No 108 (23 April 
2012) at 1755 (Hon Jason Kenney). See also House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship 
and Immigration, ????????, 41-1, No 31 (26 April 2012) (Hon Jason Kenney); House of Commons, 
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, ????????, 
41-1, Issue 20 (18 June 2012) (Hon Jason Kenney). ?
12. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, ????????, 40-2, No 
37 (1 December 2009) at 0955 (Hon Jason Kenney).
13. Canada, Parliament, ???????????????????????????37th Parl, 1st Sess, No 8- (18 September 
2011) at 1300 (quoting with approval a comment from an immigration lawyer, Sergio Karas, cited in 
the ???????????????during the debates by Hon Jason Kenney).
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ?
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mistakenly deny it. “As every elementary handbook of statistics will tell 
you,” reducing the likelihood of one of these errors means increasing 
the likelihood of the other kind.14 Reforming the refugee system so that 
it generates fewer mistaken grants, then, means accepting that it will 
generate more mistaken rejections.
To convince Canadians that this trade-off was desirable, Kenney had 
to decrease their concern with the possibility of rejecting genuine claims, 
or else make the possibility of accepting unfounded claims so worrying 
that it would eclipse the fact that his changes would send more people 
back to persecution (as noted at the time by the UN Committee Against 
Torture, among others).15 In the language of cognitive psychology, he had 
to manipulate the salience of these two associated risks. Throughout his 
campaign to win over Canadians’ error preference, Kenney used classic 
rhetorical techniques to turn the knobs: to make one type of harm more 
salient at the expense of the other.
Researchers have long observed that one of the reasons why “salience 
seems to have a profound impact on decisional preference” 16 is because 
decision-makers tend to “overemphasize the information their minds 
focus on.”17 In deciding which of two risky options to prefer, a decision-
maker may simply be struck by one worst-case scenario and “neglect” 
the other.18 By “selectively emphasizing” one type of harm, researchers 
are able to frame a problem so as to increase the salience of that harm, 
thereby manipulating their subjects’ perception of which potential worst-
case outcome is preferable.19 To this end, sheer repetition is a powerful 
14. Henk van den Belt & Bart Gremmen, “Between the Precautionary Principle and ‘Sound Science’: 
Distributing the Burden of Proof” (2002) 15:1 J Agricultural & Environmental Ethics?103 at 118, cited 
in Scott, ????? note 1 at 62. See also Michael J Saks & Samantha L Neufeld, “Convergent evolution 
in law and science: the structure of decision-making under uncertainty” (2011) 10:2 L Probability & 
Risk?133 at 138; RS Radford, “Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two Errors and 
the Law” (1988) 21:3 Loy LA L Rev?843 at 851, 872.
15. See Terry Milewski, “Canada accused of ‘complicity’ in torture in UN report: UN body says 
changes to Canada’s immigration laws risk human rights violations,” ???? ???? (1 June 2012); 
Canadian Council for Refugees & Amnesty International Canada, Media Release, “New refugee 
system does not treat refugees fairly or protect those most at risk” (4 December 2012).
16. Van Schie & Van der Pligt, ????? note 9 at 274. For a review see Cass R Sunstein, ??????
???????????????(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) Chapter 1; Cass R Sunstein, ????????
?????????????????????????????????????????(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) Chapter 4 
[Sunstein 2005].
17. Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, “Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk” 
(2012) 127:3 Q J Economics 1243 at 1245.
18. ???? at 1245.  For a review see Sunstein 2007, ????? note 16, Chapter 1; Sunstein 2005, ????? 
note 16 at 45-49, 89-91, 208-209. 
19. Van Schie & Van der Pligt, ????? note 9 at 271.
?? ?????????????????????????
tool. The more often we hear a statement, the more familiar it feels and the 
more it starts to ring true.20 
In the lead-up to the legislative changes, Kenney highlighted the 
purported harms of mistaken grants at every opportunity, using “such 
in? ammatory language that it has changed the terms of the national 
debate.”21 As he repeated at every turn, our system was staggering beneath 
the weight of a “massive surge” of cheats and liars:22 these “lawbreakers 
and queue-jumpers”23 were arriving in droves to “violate our fair rules,”24
“game our system and abuse our generosity.”25 They were costing Canada 
? nancially, “asking where they can get their welfare cheque” upon arrival 
at the airport.26 They were costing us politically by forcing us to impose 
visas on friendly countries,27 causing a “diplomatic row”28 that was hurting 
Canada’s image.29 The fact that people could come to Canada and make 
a refugee claim inland, rather than “patiently waiting in the queue”30 to 
immigrate, was “an insult to the millions of people who aspire to come 
20. “A reliable way to make people believe in falsehoods is frequent repetition, because familiarity 
is not easily distinguished from truth.” Daniel Kahneman, ?????????????????????? (New York: Farrar, 
Straus & Giroux, 2011) 62. 
21. Marci McDonald, “And you think Harper is Right Wing: The ascent of Jason Kenney,” ????
?????? (May 2014) 27. As one reporter noted, for example, in describing on an open letter that Kenney 
wrote to Amnesty International in response to the organization’s criticisms of his ministry, “The tone 
of Mr. Kenney’s letter…feels personal. It reads like the kind of letter we sometimes write when we 
feel wronged, but then delete before sending. The tone makes sense only if Mr. Kenney recently broke 
up with Amnesty International.” Tabatha Southey, “Look out, Unicef. Next Jason Kenney might be 
gunning for you,” ?????????????? ??? (12 August 2011).
22. Cited in ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 2011 FC 634 at para 44, 
390 FTR 248.  
23. Cited in Nicholas Köhler, “A crackdown on queue-jumpers: Will the Tories make bogus refugee 
claims an election issue?,” ????????? (3 August 2009) 19.
24. Cited in McDonald, ????? note 21 at 35.
25. Cited in Campbell Clark, “Minister calls for overhaul of Canada’s refugee system,” ??????????
???? ??? (15 July 2009).
26. Cited in Steven Chase and Tamara Baluja, “Kenney tightens rules for questionable asylum 
seekers,” ?????????????? ??? (16 February 2012).
27. See Kenney’s comments quoted in ???????????? ?? ??????? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ????
?????????????2010 FC 1281 at para 46, 381 FTR 74 [???????????]. See also Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper’s comments, cited in Campbell Clark, “Ottawa announces deal to fast-track Mexican refugees,” 
?????????????????? (14 February 2013) (“On a visit to Mexico in 2009, Mr. Harper even told the 
Mexicans the visa restrictions were not their fault, but Canada’s. ‘This is a problem in Canadian 
refugee law which encourages bogus claims,’ he said.”); Köhler, ????? note 23.
28. Cited in ???????????, ???? at para 46. 
29. See discussion in Köhler, ??????note 23; Carl Meyer, “Where’s the beef? Sizing up Canada-
Mexico relations,” ??????? (26 May 2010). 
30. Cited in Köhler, ????? note 23. See also Hon Jason Kenney (Address delivered at the Faculty 
of Law, University of Western Ontario, 11 February 2011), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
Canada: Newsroom Archives: Speeches for 2011, online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/
media/speeches/2011/2011-02-11.asp> [“Speech at Western”]. 
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ?
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to Canada legally,”31 and was also jeopardizing their warm welcome: 
“when Canadians don’t think the government can control its own borders, 
public support for generous levels of immigration drops signi? cantly.”32 It 
was likewise “an insult to the important concept of refugee protection”33
and kept us from doing more to help genuine refugees, who in Kenney’s 
esteem were not those who arrive “illegally…on dangerous vessels 
across the oceans,”34 but rather those “living in UN refugee camps by the 
millions.”35 Moreover, our security was compromised. We had become an 
obvious destination for “any serious criminal, any terrorist, any dictator” 
with a fake passport.36 And, of course, handing out refugee status to cheats 
and liars was rewarding their deception and allowing them to “play this 
country for fools.”37
Emphasizing the price that Canada is paying to protect refugees not 
only increases our concern with mistaken grants, it also decreases the 
salience of the risk of sending them back to persecution. Drawing attention 
to the costs inherent in reducing a risk—bringing these costs “on-screen”38
—is an effective way of decreasing its salience. In one study, for example, 
parents were very worried about the asbestos in their children’s schools 
and demanded that it be removed, even though experts assured them 
that it posed only a minimal risk. Once it became clear that removing 
the asbestos would cause the schools to be closed for weeks, however, 
“parental attitudes turned right around” and asbestos no longer seemed 
very dangerous.39 Such studies have led Sunstein to predict, for example, 
“that if people were informed that eliminating pesticides would lead to 
31. Cited in Köhler, supra note 23. See also “Speech at Western,” ibid.
32. “Speech at Western,” ibid.
33. Cited in Cervenakova, supra note 27 at para 46.
34. “Speech at Western,” supra note 30.
35. Cited in Cervenakova, supra note 27 at para 46. See also discussion in McDonald, supra note 
21 at 38. On Kenney’s analysis, when a claimant comes to Canada without authorization “rather than 
applying for refugee status at a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of? ce abroad,” even 
if her claim is genuine, not only is she diverting resources that could be put to better use resettling 
refugees from abroad, but “the integrity of our immigration system is compromised, it undermines 
the entire immigration process, and it undermines the con? dence and respect for that process that 
we require amongst all of those law-abiding immigrants.” “Speech at Western,” supra note 30. For 
discussion and critique of this argument see Andy Lamey, Frontier Justice: The Global Refugee Crisis 
and What to Do About It (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2013) 243-247.
36. “Speech at Western,” supra note 30. 
37. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Evidence, 40-3, No 
12 (4 May 2010) at 1540 (quoting with approval from an editorial in The Globe and Mail, in comments 
to the committee by Hon Jason Kenney). See also House of Commons, Proceedings of the Standing 
Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Evidence, 41-1, Issue 20 (18 June 2012) 
(Hon Jason Kenney): “I do not like us being taken for suckers.” 
38. See discussion in Sunstein 2005, supra note 16 at 47-49. 
39. Ibid at 47-48.
?? ?????????????????????????
a signi? cant cost in the price of apples and oranges, the perceived risk 
would go down.”40 
In addition, Kenney sought to decrease concern about mistaken denials 
by creating the impression of a high base rate of fraudulent claims. No one 
knows what percentage of refugee claimants lie to the Board, including 
Kenney himself. As his then Director General recently admitted, “We 
never really had quanti? able information on how much fraud there was.”41
But if most claimants are frauds, then mistaken grants are unlikely. This 
suggestion may not have much effect on those for whom this kind of harm 
is already very worrying—when a risk is salient, “degrees of unlikeliness 
seem to provide no comfort”42—but it will have an evident effect on those 
who judge its cost, instead, based on some sense of its magnitude and its 
likelihood.43 Moreover, rhetoric that works to create the impression of a 
high base rate of fraudulent claims can become a self-ful? lling prophecy. 
If members themselves can be made to believe that most claimants are 
liars, then since they will be more likely to view claimants with suspicion, 
they will be more likely to conclude that they are lying: “investigator 
bias” is the well-noted tendency of those looking for deception to ? nd it 
where none exists.44 More negative decisions, in turn, only strengthen the 
appearance that many claimants are frauds.
Kenney used several effective methods of creating the impression of a 
high base rate of lying claimants. His rhetoric brought the ‘bogus’ refugee 
claimant squarely to the forefront of the popular imagination, and one of his 
most obvious rhetorical strategies was what psychologists call “imaging 
40. Ibid at 49.
41. Quoted in McDonald, supra note 21 at 37. Of note, when Board members ? nd that a claim is 
clearly fraudulent, by law they must indicate this in their decision: the Board must designate the claim 
as having ‘no credible basis’ if it is “of the opinion, in rejecting a claim, that there was no credible or 
trustworthy evidence on which it could have made a favourable decision” (Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s. 107(2) [IRPA]). In the nine years leading up to Kenney’s changes, the 
Board made such a ? nding in 2.7% of the claims that it decided on the merits, and in the ? rst two years 
of the new system, in 2.6%. “These ? gures contradict the exaggerated rhetoric about Canada’s refugee 
determination process being subject to widespread abuse by fraudulent claimants in the lead up to the 
reforms” Angus Grant & Sean Rehaag, “Unappealing: An Assessment of the Limits on Appeal Rights 
in Canada’s New Refugee Determination System” (2016) 49:1 UBC L Rev 203 at 253. 
42. John Weingart, Waste is a terrible thing to mind: risk, radiation and distrust of government 
(Princeton, NJ: Center for Analysis of Public Issues, 2001) 362, cited in Cass R. Sunstein, “Probability 
Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law” (2002) 112:1 Yale LJ 61 at 61. See generally Sunstein 
2005, supra note 16.
43. For discussion, see Evans Cameron, supra note 1 at Chapter 1.
44. See, e.g., SM Kassin & RJ Norwick, “Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of 
Innocence” (2004) 28:2 L & Human Behavior 211 at 213; Christian A Meissner & Saul M Kassin, 
“‘He’s guilty!’: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception” (2002) 26:5 L & Human 
Behavior 469; Karl Ask, Anna Rebelius & Pär Anders Granhag, “The ‘Elasticity’ of Criminal 
Evidence: A Moderator of Investigator Bias” (2008) 22 Applied Cognitive Psychology 1245.
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ?
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the numerator”: 45 he illustrated his arguments with numerous concrete 
examples of actual lying claimants.46 Allowing us to picture a particular 
person is one of the most effective ways of increasing our impression that 
there are many more people like her. It is why advertisements for lotteries 
always show a photograph of the winner holding the cheque: so that we 
can “image” her, the numerator, and neglect the denominator, the millions 
of people who played and lost. And time and again, Kenney used a tactic 
that has become a prominent feature of the refugee protection debate 
worldwide,47 one that the Court has recently noted is “both unfair and 
inaccurate”48 and that re? ects “a grossly simplistic understanding of the 
refugee process:”49 implying that any and all rejected claims must have 
been fraudulent.50 
In sum, Kenney made very astute use of rhetorical tools that in? uence 
how listeners perceive, assess and weigh competing risks to reduce popular 
concern with wrongly rejecting refugees and to raise the alarm about the 
costs of mistaken grants. Then, in December 2012, he “performed radical 
surgery”51 on Canada’s refugee determination system, bringing about “the 
most dramatic change since the Second World War.”52
At around the same time, the refugee crisis sparked by the outbreak 
of civil war in Syria was intensifying across the Middle East and North 
45. See for example Thomas Gilovich, Dale Grif? n & Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: 
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 413-414; 
Paul Slovic, Ellen Peters & Melissa L. Finucane, “Affect, Risk, and Decision Making” (2005) 24:4 
Health Psychology S35 at S37; Paul Slovic, John Monahan & Donald G. MacGregor, “Violence Risk 
Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instructions and 
Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats” (2000) 24 L &  Human Behavior 271.
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Africa.53 In September 2015, the photograph of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-
old Syrian boy who drowned attempting to reach safety, hit newspapers 
around the globe. This photograph has been widely credited with focusing 
the world’s attention, at least for a time, on the plight of refugees ? eeing 
the region. It is generally accepted that this photograph helped to make 
Canada’s response to refugees a “de? ning issue” of the 2015 national 
election , which saw the election of a Prime Minister who ran on the promise 
to bring 25,000 Syrian refugees to Canada by the end of that year.54 It has 
also been suggested that this photograph had a “disproportionate effect” 
on public opinion here because it “hit close to home:”55 members of the 
Kurdi family had unsuccessfully applied to come to Canada. For a time, 
Alan Kurdi’s little face became the face of mistaken rejection. 
Our ability to change the channel when confronted with human suffering 
is, of course, profound. But the following year brought a spectacle from 
which it was harder to turn away: the 2016 US election and all that followed. 
As pollsters must ever remind us, “Canadians aren’t as accepting as we 
think.”56 But ‘welcoming’ and ‘generous’ are key aspects of “the way many 
Canadians traditionally see themselves.”57 A new government website, 
which allowed us “to track the arrival of Syrian refugees in communities 
across the country, receive information on how they could help welcome 
the refugees, and view photos and stories of refugee resettlement,” bore 
the heading “Open Hearts and Welcoming Communities: It’s the Canadian 
Way.”58 Crucially, though, we see ourselves as warm and generous not 
just in absolute terms but in relative terms: we are a “welcoming land…
unlike our neighbour to the south.”59 Canadians’ opinion of human rights 
53. See, e.g., Mark Tran, “UN warns of worst refugee crisis in nearly 20 years” ???????????? (19 
June 2013), online: <www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jun/19/refugee-crisis-world-
worst-united-nations>; Lindsey Phillips, “Top 10 of 2013 – Issue #4: The Escalating Syrian Refugee 
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December 2013), online: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2013-–-issue-4-escalating-
syrian-refugee-crisis-challenges-international-communitys>.
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in the US started to decline in 2015,60 and even under President Obama, 
polls showed that we “associate[d] few positive attributes with the U.S.”61
After President Trump was elected, with esteem for the US “plummeting” 
across the globe, Canada showed “the largest such decline of any country 
within the Western Hemisphere.”62 In the ? rst months of 2017, as the US 
administration announced that it was temporarily barring the citizens of 
seven Muslim-majority countries, along with all refugees, from entering 
the country, our opinion of our neighbour’s human rights record reached 
its lowest level recorded to that point, and our Prime Minister famously 
assured refugees via tweet that “Canadians will welcome you.”63 
A risk’s salience may be affected by a decision-maker’s “self-
categorization,” by how she conceives of her own identity in relation to 
it.64 Decision-makers’ risk judgments will reliably change in response to 
experimental manipulations that affect how they see themselves and their 
decision-making role. When reminded of their role as parents, for example, 
subjects perceived strangers to be more dangerous and trusted them less.65
When reminded of their own mortality, subjects were more inclined to 
support harsh measures to counter the risk of terrorism.66 Legal scholar 
and former Board member Audrey Macklin observed years ago that some 
members “conceive of their mandate in terms of ful? lling Canada’s human 
rights obligations under the Refugee Convention and Canadian law,” while 
others “understand themselves as gatekeepers, tasked with protecting 
Canada’s borders from unscrupulous and undeserving migrants who 
60. Zilio, ????? note 54.
61. Angus Reid Institute, “Canada-U.S. perspectives: ‘sunny ways’ versus gloomy days” (9 March 
2016), online: <http://angusreid.org/canada-us-perspectives/>.
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abuse the asylum system to gain entry.”67 Kenney’s rhetoric emphasized 
the latter identity. In the ? rst months of 2017, looking south with mouths 
agape, more Board members may have been reminded of the former. 
And if af? rming this identity was pleasing, if it brought with it a warm 
satis? ed feeling—smugness, if you will—this would only have intensi? ed 
its effect on risk salience. The more appealing a decision, the less we 
worry about its attendant risks.68 If preferring mistaken grants allowed 
members to identify themselves as Canadians—as a different and better 
kind of creature than their southern neighbours—they may more easily 
have looked past any harms that they associated with accepting unfounded 
claims. 
When Board members now look south, however, they may well 
be struck by a different vision. Canada does not accept refugee claims 
at of? cial ‘ports of entry’ along our southern border on the increasingly 
untenable premise that asylum seekers will get a fair hearing in the US. 69
Those who enter Canada at unauthorized crossings, however, may make 
refugee claims at a government of? ce inland. By August 2018, around 
30,000 people had side-stepped our ports of entry in this way in order to 
make refugee claims.70 
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The images of masses of claimants crossing ‘illegally’ into Canada 
have caught and held the public’s attention.71 For a majority of Canadians, 
the fear that the country “is being invaded”72 has become powerfully 
salient ; pollsters predict that it may in fact threaten the government’s 
chances of re-election.73 At least one Canadian commentator has called 
on the government “to build a wall.”74 Moreover, 40% of respondents to a 
recent poll, and nearly two-thirds of those who identify as Conservative, 
believe that these claimants are “mostly economic migrants” and not 
refugees.75 “The perception is that these people are illegal and that they’re 
violating Canada’s borders and that they’re just queue jumpers trying to 
get freebies on welfare.”76 In short, the sheer number of new arrivals, and 
the manner of their arrival, are greatly increasing popular concern with the 
purported harms of mistaken grants. 
Conclusion
If you had to make a refugee claim at some point during this historical 
narrative, when would you choose to do it? If you chose the period when 
Kenney was hard-selling his plan to limit ‘bogus’ claims, you chose 
poorly. At that point, the Board’s acceptance rate, which had “declined 
substantially since 2006 when the Conservative Party took of? ce,” was 
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approaching an all-time low.77 If you chose the time when Prime Minister 
Trudeau was tweeting Canada’s welcome to refugees, you chose wisely. 
At that point, our Refugee Board was accepting a greater percentage of 
claims than it had at any point in the previous 27 years.78
Myriad other factors affect the Board’s acceptance rate in signi? cant 
ways, of course.79 But as Macklin notes, “it would be naïve to suggest 
that decision makers are impervious to the political currents circulating 
around them.”80 There is ample evidence of the power of political and 
media rhetoric to sway public opinion about refugees, both positively and 
negatively,81 and as the Federal Court has observed, Board members make 
their decisions “in the glare of…political and public attention.”82 Or as 
Lord Sedley of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales has put it: “You 
can attend ? fty social gatherings, you can drink in a hundred bars, where 
the conversation never comes remotely near the problems of eviction or 
bankruptcy; but it’s unusual to be in any gathering where immigration 
does not sooner or later come up.”83 
Policy concerns have no place in a refugee hearing room.84 A Board 
member’s sole responsibility is to determine whether the claimant needs 
protection. Members have no broader mandate to save Canada money, to 
spare it embarrassment, or to promote a particular vision of the social order. 
In her study of the Board’s institutional culture, however, political scientist 
Rebecca Hamlin noted that its members at times came under considerable 
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pressure to make negative decisions on policy grounds. 85 Hamlin explained 
that there was “no clear mechanism for how politicians or policymakers 
can force the [Board] to crack down and be less generous.”86 Yet as long 
as the law allows members to resolve their doubts as they choose, none is 
needed. Convincing them that granting refugee status is the wrong mistake 
will achieve the same result. 
Sending a refugee home to persecution is the wrong mistake. This 
error preference, anchored in the Refugee Convention, is as fundamental 
to refugee law as Blackstone’s Maxim is to the criminal law.87 Fact-? nding 
structures that entrench this foundational normative principle are refugee 
law’s strongest tool for protecting these life and death decisions from 
what Lord Sedley calls “the ambient pressure” on decision-makers “to 
put a ? nger in the dyke, to stem the tide, to stop the rot; to reject the 
stories they hear from asylum-seekers so that they can be sent home.”88
Without a coherent and principled law of fact-? nding, it is too much to 
hope that each refugee claim will be heard on its own merits. As the harms 
of mistaken grants become more salient with each unauthorized border 
crossing, Canadian refugee law must ? x this elemental ? aw at its core.
85. Rebecca Hamlin, Let Me Be A Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the 
United States, Canada, and Australia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 97. 
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